

Stockton California

Marshall Plan

A Violence Reduction Strategy

David Bennett Consulting

in association with

Donna Lattin

8 February 2013



Agenda

- Introduction - (8:00 - 8:15)
- Overview (*Bennett & Lattin*) - (8:15 - 9:00)
- Local Violence Data (*Stewart Wakeling*) - (9:00 - 9:40)
- Police Department Issues (*Chief Jones*) - (9:40 - 10:05)
- Panel Discussions (*Peacekeepers & Clients*) - (10:05 - 10:45)
- Recommendations (*Bennett & Lattin*) - (10:45 - 11:30)
- Final Remarks (*City Manager, Bob Deis*) - (11:30 - 11:45)
- Public Comment (11:45 – 12:00)

Marshall Plan Committee Members

1. Mayor Anthony Silva, City of Stockton
2. Councilmember Elbert Holman, City Council
3. Bob Deis, City Manager
4. Rev. Wayne Bibelheimer, Quail Lakes Baptist Church
5. Bobby Bivens, President, Stockton/San Joaquin NAACP
6. Mick Founts, Superintendent of Schools, San Joaquin County Office of Education
7. Peter Fox, Public Defender, San Joaquin County
8. Kevin Hatano, Program Coordinator, Operation Ceasefire

Marshall Plan Committee Members ...

9. Stephanie James, Chief Probation Officer, San Joaquin County
10. James Jimenez, Interim CEO, San Joaquin County Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
11. Eric Jones, Stockton Police Chief
12. Sovanna Koeurt, Executive Director, Asian Pacific Self-Development & Residential Assoc.
13. Dr. Steve Lowder, Superintendent, Stockton Unified School District
14. Steve Moore, San Joaquin County Sheriff
15. Brett Morgan, Judge, San Joaquin County Superior Court
16. Jose Rodriguez, Executive Director, El Concilio

Marshall Plan Committee Members ...

17. Benjamin Saffold, Downtown Stockton Alliance
18. Pastor Glen Shields, Progressive Community Church
19. Vic Singh, Director, Behavioral Health Services, San Joaquin County
20. Ger Vang, CEO, Lao Family Community of Stockton, Inc.
21. Carlos Villapudua, Supervisor, San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors
22. Doug Wilhoit, CEO, Greater Stockton Chamber of Commerce
23. James Willett, District Attorney, San Joaquin County
24. Ralph Womack, City of Stockton, Operation Peacekeeper

Marshall Plan Committee Members ...

Former members

25. Ann Johnson, former Mayor, City of Stockton

26. Carl Tolivar, former Superintendent of Stock Unified

Staff

Christian Clegg, Assistant to the City Manager

Connie Cochran, Public Information Officer

Karen Costa, Executive Assistant to the City Manager


PROJECT GOAL

Develop a Violence Reduction Plan

*Stop, Interrupt, and Prevent Gun Violence &
Homicides*


LOCAL TRENDS IN VIOLENCE

Stockton's Recent Dramatic Increase in Homicides since 2008



* Source: Data: FBI Uniform Crime Reports; Stockton City Police via CrimeMapping.com; (accessed May 14, 2012)

Stockton's High Homicide Rate is Chronic



(Data Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1985 – 2011 (preliminary))

There is Evidence that the Ceasefire Program Reduced Homicides in the Past (1997 - 2002)






Fig. 2. Monthly Counts of Stockton Homicide Incidents, January 1999 - December 2005.

(Braga 2008)


(Data Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1985 - 2011 (preliminary))

Homicide Rate Expected to Parallel Violence Rate: Stockton is Different

California (1985 - 2010)



Stockton (1985 - 2011)




Stockton Homicide Rate Has Not Tracked Violence Rate since 2006

Stockton Violent Crime & Homicide Trends (2001 - 2011)



Number of Police Officers & Homicides




(NOTE: The Homicide rate (per 100,000 population) was multiplied by 10 for ease of comparison with the number of officers)

Stockton Hotspots

Violent Crimes Distribution

(Stockton 11/5/2011 – 5/3/2012; n = 3640)



Data Source: Stockton Police Department via CrimeMapping.com N = 3505. (135 excluded due to geocoding problems)

Example Kernal Density Estimate (Cartographica)

Violent Crime Victims: San Joaquin Youth Homicide Victim Profile (Age 10 – 24)

- Where


- Street (52%)
- Inside (home of victim or other residence) (33%)
- Vehicle (10%)
- Other (5%)

- Circumstance


- 19% drive-by shootings
- 30-50% linked to argument between victim & perpetrator

Stockton Hotspots (November 5, 2011 - May 5, 2012)

(Homicides)



(Shootings into Occupied Dwellings)



(Triangular (Conic) Kernel Density method); data source Stockton Police Department via CrimeMapping.com

Local Findings:

- High violence is CHRONIC by only recently ACUTE
- No relationship between total violent crime & homicides
- Homicide trends in Stockton don't follow those of the State (local issues drive trends)
- Hot Spots can be identified and are discrete but dispersed
- Evidence that past Ceasefire program reduced violence

WHAT DO WE KNOW
ABOUT VIOLENCE?

What do We Know About Violence?

- Violence is learned
- Violence is contagious
- Violence is not inevitable
- Violence can be stopped

Risk Factors for Violence

- Anti-social norms
- Availability of guns
- School failure
- Having been a victim of violence
- Family violence
- Lack of positive role models

Hot Places – Violence is Concentrated

- 30,000 street segments in Seattle (4-5% accounted for 50% of crime incidents each year over 14 years)

- FINDINGS:

- Crime is not a moving target
- Prediction accuracy for future crime is higher for places than people
- No evidence of displacement after focus on Hot Spots - a diffusion of good effects
- Chronic, truant juveniles and Hot Spots overlap

(Weisburd 2012)

Most violent youth desist

- Gang involvement increases criminal activity - only while in gang
- Of youth convicted of serious felony offenses, only 8% continued on into the adult criminal justice system

(Pathways to Desistance Project)

WHAT DOESN'T WORK
TO REDUCE VIOLENCE

Relative Effectiveness of Crime / Violence Reduction Programs

30 – 50% Reduction

- Ceasefire / Ceasefire Re-entry
- Hospital Interventions
- HOPE Probation Violation Program
- Street Outreach Workers

20 – 30% Reduction

- Aggression Replacement Therapy
- High Risk Youth Crime Prevention
- Big Brother / Big Sister
- Multi-Systemic Family Treatment

10 – 20% Reduction

- Supervision & Treatment and Cognitive
- Neighborhood Disorder Reduction

NO REDUCTION

- Incarceration alone / Supervision only
- GREAT Gang Education Program

Increase Rate of Offending


- Scared Straight
- Boot Camp
- Intensive Supervision (no services)
- Juvenile Detention (all but High Violent)

Average Recidivism Reduction ~ 10%

NYC Crime Reduction Experience


Challenges Assumptions about Crime/Violence Reduction:

- No change in poverty
- No change in drug use
- 32% drop in prison commitments
- Not explained by change in demographics



What Doesn't Work - Moving Individuals

(Moving On Project)



WHAT DOES WORK TO REDUCE VIOLENCE

Characteristics of What Works

- Targeted – high risk persons, places, situations
- Changes Behavior/Norms
 - Clear and consistent messages
 - Community engagement and moral voice
 - Connect to services
 - Consequences are swift & certain
- Capacity of System to Respond

Two Approaches to Crime Control: (Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)

1. Traditional ('The Hard Way')

- .1000 officers
- .6 months
- .17,000 felony arrests

Outcomes:

Dried up drug market
Overwhelmed Court
Success at great cost




Two Approaches to Crime Control: (Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)

2. Strategic: Ceasefire Model (The 'Smart Way')

- .Data analysis to target 'influential players'
- .Warn in advance of consequences
- .Communicate that their success is important
- .Involve the Community
- .Small number of arrests

Outcomes: Dried up Drug Market
Required little or no
additional resources



THE PLANNING APPROACH

A Targeted System-Based Violence Reduction Strategy

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

A Systems-Based Approach to Violence Reduction

