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 8

9 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 11 SACRAMENTO DIVISION  
 12

13 In re:  
 14 CITY OF STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA,  
 15 Debtor.

Case No. 2012-32118  
 D.C. No. OHS-1  
 Chapter 9

**DECLARATION OF ERIC JONES IN  
 SUPPORT OF CITY OF STOCKTON'S  
 REPLY TO OBJECTIONS TO ITS  
 STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS  
 UNDER SECTION 109(C) OF THE  
 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY  
 CODE**

Date: February 26, 2013  
 Time: 1:30 p.m.  
 Dept: C  
 Judge: Hon. Christopher M. Klein

1 I, Eric Jones, hereby declare:

2 1. I am the Chief of Police in the City of Stockton, California (“the City” or  
3 “Stockton”). I make this declaration in support of the City’s Reply to Objections to Statement of  
4 Qualifications Under Section 109(c). On June 28, 2012, I executed a declaration in support of the  
5 Statement of Qualifications the City filed on June 29, 2012 (the “June Declaration” or “June  
6 Decl.”).

7 2. I have reviewed the declarations, reports, and qualifications of David Neumark and  
8 Joseph Brann, filed by the so-called Capital Markets Creditors on December 14, 2012. I attended  
9 the deposition of Brann on January 24, 2013. While Brann was a police chief in the early 1990’s,  
10 neither Brann nor Neumark appear to have much, if any, knowledge about the City of Stockton’s  
11 crime situation, police practices, or history. By contrast, I have served in the Stockton Police  
12 Department (“the Department” or “SPD”) in some capacity for over 19 years. In March 2012, I  
13 was named Chief of Police. Before that, I served as an Assistant Chief from September 2011 to  
14 March 2012, and as Deputy Chief from March 2008 to September 2011. Prior to that, beginning  
15 in 1993, I assumed increasing levels of responsibility within the department as a Police Officer,  
16 Training Officer, Sergeant, Lieutenant, and Captain. I hold a Bachelor’s degree in Criminal  
17 Justice from California State University, Sacramento. In 2007, I earned a Master of Public  
18 Administration Degree from National University. I am a member of the California Police Chiefs  
19 Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, hold certificates from the  
20 Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, and am a member of the FBI’s National  
21 Academy Law Enforcement Executive Development Association.

22 Crime in Stockton

23 3. By comparing 2011 crime rates to rates in the early 1990’s, Brann paints a  
24 misleading picture of crime in Stockton. Brann Report, at 4-5. In the early 1990’s, crack-cocaine  
25 gang wars significantly contributed to Stockton’s crime rates, particularly its murder rate. Those  
26 wars ended, and between 1993 and 1998, Stockton’s murder rate fell. Its murder rate fell again  
27 between 2006 and 2008. By contrast, its murder rate increased every single year between 2008  
28 and 2012. Also, Stockton’s police staffing was lower in 1990 than it was for the rest of the

1 decade. Brann takes neither Stockton's complete crime data nor its relative staffing into account  
2 in his analysis of crime trends in Stockton. Without accounting for context, it is inappropriate  
3 and irrelevant to compare crime rates in the early 1990's to crime rates today.<sup>1</sup>

4 4. If Brann chose a more relevant year as a baseline, such as 2007, before the cuts in  
5 compensation, benefits, and budgeted sworn officers occurred, he would see crime is increasing  
6 in Stockton.

7 5. Even accepting Brann's 1990 baseline for homicide, in 2012, Stockton  
8 experienced a record-setting 71 homicides, which translates to the same 0.24 homicides per 1,000  
9 residents that he calculated as having occurred in 1990. Brann Report, at 4. At no point in  
10 between 1990 and 2012 did Stockton ever come close to 0.24 homicides per 1,000 residents. By  
11 Brann's own deposition testimony, crime rates have been declining significantly over the last 20  
12 years in the United States and California in particular. Brann Dep., pp. 184:24-185:9; 185:23-  
13 186:17. The fact Stockton's murder rate is the same today as it was approximately 20 years ago  
14 speaks to how unique and dangerous Stockton is compared to other cities in California, and  
15 demonstrates Stockton's need for experienced, high-quality police officers.

16 6. In my experience, the best statistical indicator for the City's property crime levels  
17 is likely auto-theft data, because, historically, nearly 100% of auto-thefts are reported. The fact  
18 that between 2011 and 2012 auto-thefts increased by 49% shows the real depth of the City's  
19 property crime problem. I also believe that property crime rates are much worse than the  
20 statistics show. Beginning in 2009, there was a shift to mandatory online reporting of property  
21 crimes in the City. With this shift came a dramatic decrease in reported property crimes. I  
22 believe the reason for this is that when people see all they will get from online reporting is  
23 information for filing an insurance claim, they exit the system. Brann admitted in his deposition  
24 that he was unaware of this change in property crime reporting. He also admitted he did not take  
25 the change into account when analyzing the City's crime rates. Brann Dep., p. 198:4-17.

26 //

27  
28 <sup>1</sup> Stockton violent and property crime data from 1985-2011 is publicly available at <http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/>. A true and correct copy of the publicly available data is attached hereto as Exhibit A.  
OHSUSA:753138671.3

Retention and Recruitment Problems

1  
2           7.       In the June Declaration, I testified that Stockton had 441 sworn officers in fiscal  
3 year 2007-08, and 343 sworn officer positions in 2012. I also testified that only 320 of those 343  
4 positions were filled as of June 28, 2012. June Decl., ¶¶ 5-6. Thus, Brann mischaracterized my  
5 testimony when he quoted me as stating Stockton's "officer per thousand ratio of 1.17 is the  
6 lowest in California for cities with populations above 250,000." Brann Report, at 5. He used the  
7 number 343 to calculate his 1.17 figure, when he should have used 320, the number of sworn  
8 officers that I stated the Department had at the time. Using 320 would have led to a smaller  
9 officer-per-thousand figure, 1.07.

10           8.       There are two primary reasons why, in June 2012, the Department was unable to  
11 fill its budgeted sworn officer positions. The first reason was constant attrition. Even brand new  
12 officers were leaving the Department at a rapid pace for other police departments offering better  
13 compensation and benefits. The second reason was a low-quality applicant pool. Both Brann and  
14 Neumark are, for the most part, correct in stating the number of officer applicants we have had  
15 since 2008. However, the number of applicants standing alone matters little when none or barely  
16 any are qualified. A large portion of the applicants to the Department over the past few years  
17 have failed background checks or were running from problems in other departments to anywhere  
18 they could. As a dangerous city, Stockton cannot afford to compromise its police hiring standards  
19 and allow these unqualified applicants to protect its residents and businesses.

20           9.       As of February 13, 2013, the Department is still unable to fill its 343 budgeted  
21 sworn officer positions for the same two primary reasons discussed above. The Department's  
22 headcount remained in the 320's throughout January 2013, and only recently got up to 330, where  
23 it is today.

24           10.      Both Neumark and Brann incorrectly rely upon an article stating that 1,300  
25 applicants participated in a physical agility test for the Department in support of their arguments  
26 that the Department is not having recruitment problems. Neumark Report, at 21; Brann Report at  
27 18. The article's facts are wrong. The number 1,300 captures the number of applicants who  
28

1 RSVP'd to the physical agility test. Less than half that number actually showed up. Many were  
2 quickly disqualified.

3 11. Both Neumark and Brann make much of the fact that the Department hired  
4 roughly 70 new officers in 2012. Neumark Report, at 20; Brann Report, at 18. Using this figure  
5 to argue the Department is in good shape in terms of hiring is off-base for two reasons. First,  
6 despite these hires, the Department still cannot reach its budgeted number of sworn officers. As a  
7 consequence, drawing attention to this figure actually emphasizes how many officers the  
8 Department has been losing. Second, hiring roughly 70 new officers in one year—something the  
9 Department had no other choice but to do—is dangerous for a city like Stockton, which needs not  
10 just officers, but experienced officers. Neither Neumark nor Brann takes into account the danger  
11 to public safety and the Department itself of having too many new officers on the force.

12 12. Brann calls into doubt the fact that the Department has difficulty recruiting  
13 qualified lateral candidates. Brann Report, at 16. To do this, he cites the 164 lateral transfer  
14 applications the Department received in 2011 and 2012. Even though he correctly notes, “[i]t  
15 appears that the SPD did not elect to hire any of these lateral transfer candidates,” he states the  
16 fact they applied “is an indication of interest by lateral candidates.” *Id.* Brann has no knowledge  
17 of the quality of these applicants, and if he did, he would see why the Department hired none of  
18 them. Simply put, each applicant was unqualified. Brann fails to appreciate the idea that the  
19 number of applicants does not matter if none of them are qualified.

20 *The Reasons Officers Left*

21 13. Neumark and Brann argue that because Stockton police officers transferred to  
22 Departments located in cities like Oceanside, CA and Monterey, CA, they did not leave Stockton  
23 for monetary reasons, but because they wanted lifestyle changes. Neumark Report, at 8; Brann  
24 Report, at 13. I do not believe this is the case, and believe that monetary reasons are at least  
25 significant factors in why these officers left. As I stated in my deposition, I conducted exit  
26 interviews with the officers who transferred out of the Department in 2012 while I was Chief.  
27 Neumark and Brann did not take part in any of these interviews. All of the officers told me that  
28 monetary issues were the primary reason they were leaving. Since fiscal year 2008, many of

1 these officers experienced cuts in their pay and benefits as high as 20% and 30%. The  
2 Department had very few officers leaving to other departments before these cuts happened. Since  
3 my deposition, I was able to reflect on the exit interviews I conducted. I specifically recall 20 of  
4 these interviews. All 20 of the officers I interviewed told me they left for monetary reasons.  
5 Many had difficulty paying bills. Others worried about retirement. And even more just wanted  
6 financial stability, something they believed the Department could not offer them.

7 14. On January 23, 2013, I attended a Stockton Police Department alumni dinner. At  
8 that dinner, I spoke with six former Stockton officers individually who transferred to different  
9 agencies in 2012. All six reiterated what they told me in their exit interviews: they left because of  
10 cuts in their pay and/or benefits.

11 15. As Chief of Police, it is my job to keep a pulse on department morale. I frequently  
12 communicate with my officers on many issues, including the City's current financial situation and  
13 the bankruptcy case. One of the most frequently expressed concerns by my officers regards  
14 compensation and benefits, and how the City's financial situation will affect them. During these  
15 conversations, many of my officers have said they will depart to another agency if the  
16 Department's PERS contract is broken. Others have stated that they will leave the Department if  
17 any additional compensation or benefits cuts occur, no matter how slight.

18 Officers-per-thousand

19 16. Brann states "it is a fallacy to attempt to establish a causal relationship between  
20 crime and police staffing levels." Brann Report, at 7. I disagree, and other reports disagree as  
21 well. For example, the University of California Berkeley report, "The Effect of Police on Crime:  
22 New Evidence from U.S. Cities, 1960-2010" finds a link between staffing levels and crime. And  
23 this is a contemporary report published on November 11, 2012. There is also a 2010 RAND  
24 Research Center on Quality Policing report, "Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime  
25 Research Can Tell Us About Investing in Police" that summarizes contemporary research also  
26 finding such a link. Additionally, San Jose's Independent Police Auditor, Judge LaDoris Cordell,  
27 stated she believes San Jose's rising crime and homicide rates are due to cuts in police staffing.

28 Mike Colgan, *San Jose's Police Auditor Blames Officer Cuts For Rising Homicide Rate*, CBS SF

1 BAY AREA, Dec. 12, 2012, [http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/12/12/san-joses-police-auditor-](http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/12/12/san-joses-police-auditor-blames-officer-cuts-for-rising-homicide-rate/)  
2 [blames-officer-cuts-for-rising-homicide-rate/](http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/12/12/san-joses-police-auditor-blames-officer-cuts-for-rising-homicide-rate/) (“Believe me, if you are intent upon burglarizing,  
3 breaking into cars or even shooting people and you know that there aren’t going to be the number  
4 of police officers out there that there used to be, you become emboldened. You become  
5 brazen.”).

6 17. Brann cites an International City/County Management Association (“ICMA”) report  
7 commissioned in 2010 by the City to suggest that Stockton may not be utilizing its police  
8 force efficiently. He admits to not having studied Stockton’s police officer utilization, despite  
9 saying he was asked to study it in his declaration. Brann Dep., pp. 50:25-51:3; Brann Decl., ¶ 2.  
10 Had he studied the Department’s police utilization data, he would have seen that the ICMA report  
11 was outdated the moment it was published and that it did not take into account the cuts in staffing  
12 that occurred as ICMA was studying the Department. Since the ICMA report, we have  
13 restructured the entire Department, reduced the amount of calls to which we respond, eliminated a  
14 narcotics unit, and taken various other steps to ensure the efficient utilization of our resources.  
15 Unlike the departments Brann refers to on page 8 of his report, we do not use sworn officers as  
16 dispatchers or staff them at construction projects. We have also civilianized many aspects of the  
17 Department to ensure that sworn officers are only used in enforcement and criminal investigation  
18 roles.

19 18. Despite Brann’s claims to the contrary, the Stockton Police Department’s officer-  
20 per-thousand ratio is low and indicates the Department needs more officers. As I cited in the June  
21 Declaration, a 2006 report commissioned by the City authored by Dr. Anthony Braga, Senior  
22 Research Fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, recommended  
23 the City reach 2.0 officers per 1,000 residents. This figure is almost double our current officer  
24 per 1,000 ratio. Unlike Brann, Braga spent substantial time studying crime and policing in  
25 Stockton specifically. His conclusion that Stockton needs more officers is thus more informed  
26 than Brann’s. Also, the City hired criminal justice consultants David Bennett and Donna Lattin  
27 for its “Marshall Plan,” which contains findings and recommendations on the topic of reducing  
28 violent crime in Stockton. Although the consultants are still finalizing their written report, they

1 presented their findings to the Department on February 8, 2013. During that presentation, they  
2 indicated that Stockton needs to budget for and hire 590 officers to effectively address its crime  
3 problems rather than the budgeted number of 343 it currently has. A true and correct copy of the  
4 consultants' Marshall Plan presentation is attached hereto as Exhibit B (see pp. 28-29).

5 Officer Experience

6 19. Brann asserts there is "no evidence" to support the contention that less experienced  
7 officers are less effective in combating a rising violent crime rate than are more experienced  
8 officers. Brann Report, at 19-20. In my experience, this assertion could not be further from the  
9 truth. Having too many inexperienced officers is dangerous to the community and the officers  
10 themselves. Inexperienced officers are more likely to be involved in vehicle chases, vehicle  
11 crashes, and shootings. There has been a 400% increase in shootings directed at our police  
12 officers since 2008 when our proportion of inexperienced officers began to climb. One of these  
13 shootings occurred on January 5, 2013. Inexperienced officers are also more likely to be involved  
14 in criminal cases being thrown out of court for reasons such as the mishandling of evidence.  
15 Stockton needs more experienced officers than it currently has given its current and historical  
16 crime profile. It is detrimental to public safety in Stockton to have too many inexperienced  
17 officers.

18 20. Neumark suggests his calculation that officer experience increased in Stockton  
19 from 10.2 to 10.9 years of experience from 2008 to 2012 "contradicts any claim that past  
20 compensation cuts have led to a 'mass exodus' of experienced police officers." Neumark Report,  
21 at 17. I disagree with this claim for two reasons. First, there has been a mass exodus of  
22 experienced officers since 2008. Brann even acknowledges these departures in his report when  
23 he says, "the departure of 21 officers with 10+ years of experience to other agencies over a five  
24 year period is a source of concern." Brann Report, at 12. Second, calculations regarding average  
25 experience are not an appropriate measure of the experience of a police force. A more  
26 appropriate measure here is the percentage of officers with less than one year of experience.  
27 Brann agrees with me that "rookie officers[] clearly are not where you want them to be yet."  
28 Brann Dep., p. 146:1-3. The percentage of Stockton police officers with less than one year

1 experience has increased from 2008 to 2012 from 6% (26 officers) to 14% (46 officers). This  
2 change demonstrates the Department has become less experienced since the cuts in compensation  
3 and benefits beginning in 2008.

4 *The Infeasibility of Outsourcing Police Services to the County*

5 21. I reviewed Robert Bobb's recommendations for the City to save money by  
6 outsourcing City policing services to San Joaquin County. Bobb Report, at 25-26. Outsourcing  
7 would be infeasible and imprudent for both agencies and the residents they serve, for a number of  
8 reasons that reflect real, tangible differences between the two agencies.

9 22. The SPD and the San Joaquin Sherriff's Office ("S/O") have different policies,  
10 procedures, and practices, ranging from the handling of evidence and asset forfeiture items, to  
11 pre-booking procedures, to the use of lethal and non-lethal weapons. Reconciling these  
12 differences would require a substantial investment in time and resources.

13 23. Communication methods and radio codes are different between the two agencies.  
14 Also, the two agencies use different channel frequencies and different codes for broadcasting  
15 information. Furthermore, the Computer-Aided-Dispatch system that SPD uses is not compatible  
16 with the S/O patrol vehicle computer equipment. Overcoming these technological barriers would  
17 be costly.

18 24. The two agencies have separate dispatch centers for receiving 911 calls and  
19 dispatching field units. The logistics of SPD receiving City calls for service and then dispatching  
20 calls to S/O units would be extremely problematic and could create the need for additional  
21 dispatch staffing in the SPD Dispatch Center. The cost here would be non-trivial.

22 25. Numerous support and follow-up functions would be impacted by outsourcing to  
23 the S/O including determining which agency would handle background information for the  
24 officers or deputies, which agency's evidence technicians would handle evidence or crime scene  
25 processing, which agency's detectives would be involved in cases, and which agency would  
26 ultimately be responsible for on-going cases in courts of law. Resolving these issues would take  
27 time and resources.



# Exhibit A

Violent crime reported by Stockton Police Dept, California											
Year	Population	Violent crime total	Murder and nonnegligent Manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Violent Crime rate	Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter rate	Forcible rape rate	Robbery rate	Aggravated assault rate
1985	176633	1561	27	91	705	738	883.8	15.3	51.5	399.1	417.8
1986	180760	2037	35	100	871	1031	1126.9	19.4	55.3	481.9	570.4
1987	188067	1821	33	107	806	875	968.3	17.5	56.9	428.6	465.3
1988	191444	2050	41	115	1076	818	1070.8	21.4	60.1	562	427.3
1989	195727	2368	42	177	1198	951	1209.8	21.5	90.4	612.1	485.9
1990	210943	2627	51	168	1305	1103	1245.4	24.2	79.6	618.7	522.9
1991	215336	2773	55	161	1493	1064	1287.8	25.5	74.8	693.3	494.1
1992	218787	3350	53	170	1531	1596	1531.2	24.2	77.7	699.8	729.5
1993	221867	3500	45	157	1554	1744	1577.5	20.3	70.8	700.4	786.1
1994	223431	3605	44	121	1433	2007	1613.5	19.7	54.2	641.4	898.3
1995	223752	3187	42	133	1228	1784	1424.3	18.8	59.4	548.8	797.3
1996	225799	3115	46	123	1313	1633	1379.5	20.4	54.5	581.5	723.2
1997	228560	2692	45	130	1078	1439	1177.8	19.7	56.9	471.6	629.6
1998	239734	2707	27	116	1011	1553	1129.2	11.3	48.4	421.7	647.8
1999	243661	2808	32	130	904	1742	1152.4	13.1	53.4	371	714.9
2000	243771	2972	30	114	1049	1779	1219.2	12.3	46.8	430.3	729.8
2001	248301	3296	30	144	1030	2092	1327.4	12.1	58	414.8	842.5
2002	252727	3693	36	141	1171	2345	1461.3	14.2	55.8	463.3	927.9
2003	265593	3625	37	155	1208	2225	1364.9	13.9	58.4	454.8	837.7
2004	274598	3700	40	108	1187	2365	1347.4	14.6	39.3	432.3	861.3
2005	281747	4202	41	109	1357	2695	1491.4	14.6	38.7	481.6	956.5
2006	289510	4288	37	102	1519	2630	1481.1	12.8	35.2	524.7	908.4
2007	297170	4216	29	105	1615	2467	1418.7	9.8	35.3	543.5	830.2
2008	293073	4322	24	105	1558	2628	1474.7	8.2	38.2	531.6	896.7
2009	292212	3703	33	82	1259	2329	1267.2	11.3	28.1	430.9	797
2010	291707	4033	49	107	1413	2464	1382.6	16.8	36.7	484.4	844.7
2011	295136	4155	58	90	1323	2684	1407.8	19.7	30.5	448.3	909.4

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, <http://ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Local/jurisbyjurisLarge.cfm>

Property crime reported by Stockton Police Dept, California												
Year	Population	Property crime total	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Property crime rate	Burglary rate	Larceny-theft rate	Motor vehicle theft rate			
1985	176633	17828	4963	11769	1096	10093.2	2809.8	6663	620.5			
1986	180760	18471	5477	11905	1089	10218.5	3030	6586.1	602.5			
1987	188067	17023	4689	11022	1312	9051.6	2493.3	5860.7	697.6			
1988	191444	18746	4866	11974	1906	9791.9	2541.7	6254.6	995.6			
1989	195727	20920	5518	12670	2732	10688.4	2819.2	6473.3	1395.8			
1990	210943	21638	5070	13037	3531	10257.7	2403.5	6180.3	1673.9			
1991	215336	21617	4926	12859	3832	10038.7	2287.6	5971.6	1779.5			
1992	218787	20411	4617	12170	3624	9329.2	2110.3	5562.5	1656.4			
1993	221867	21349	5362	12291	3696	9622.4	2416.8	5539.8	1665.9			
1994	223431	19855	4561	11152	4142	8886.4	2041.3	4991.3	1853.8			
1995	223752	17595	3836	10278	3481	7863.6	1714.4	4593.5	1555.7			
1996	225799	16286	3418	9815	3053	7212.6	1513.7	4346.8	1352.1			
1997	228560	15650	3326	9861	2463	6847.2	1455.2	4314.4	1077.6			
1998	239734	14819	3180	9669	1970	6181.4	1326.5	4033.2	821.7			
1999	243661	13738	2476	9122	2140	5638.2	1016.2	3743.7	878.3			
2000	243771	13877	2500	9259	2118	5692.6	1025.6	3798.2	868.8			
2001	248301	16432	2871	10558	3003	6617.8	1156.3	4252.1	1209.4			
2002	252727	17421	2965	11003	3453	6893.2	1173.2	4353.7	1366.3			
2003	265593	18779	3125	11791	3863	7070.6	1176.6	4439.5	1454.5			
2004	274598	18405	3067	11023	4315	6702.5	1116.9	4014.2	1571.4			
2005	281747	18861	3434	11487	3940	6694.3	1218.8	4077.1	1398.4			
2006	289510	19719	3836	12202	3681	6811.2	1325	4214.7	1271.5			
2007	297170	18677	4054	11783	2840	6285	1364.2	3965.1	955.7			
2008	293073	17955	4353	11102	2500	6126.5	1485.3	3788.1	853			
2009	292212	15427	3980	9274	2173	5279.4	1362	3173.7	743.6			
2010	291707	16177	4482	9654	2041	5545.6	1536.5	3309.5	699.7			
2011	295136	15463	4133	9651	1679	5239.3	1400.4	3270.0	568.9			

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, <http://ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Local/JurisbyJurisLarge.cfm>

# Exhibit B

Stockton California

# Marshall Plan



A Violence Reduction Strategy

David Bennett Consulting

in association with

Donna Lattin

8 February 2013

## Agenda

- Introduction - (8:00 - 8:15)
- Overview (*Bennett & Lattin*) - (8:15 - 9:00)
- Local Violence Data (*Stewart Wakeling*) - (9:00 - 9:40)
- Police Department Issues (*Chief Jones*) - (9:40 - 10:05)
- Panel Discussions (*Peacekeepers & Clients*) - (10:05 - 10:45)
- Recommendations (*Bennett & Lattin*) - (10:45 - 11:30)
- Final Remarks (*City Manager, Bob Deis*) - (11:30 - 11:45)
- Public Comment (11:45 – 12:00)

## Marshall Plan Committee Members

1. Mayor Anthony Silva, City of Stockton
2. Councilmember Elbert Holman, City Council
3. Bob Deis, City Manager
4. Rev. Wayne Bibelheimer, Quail Lakes Baptist Church
5. Bobby Bivens, President, Stockton/San Joaquin NAACP
6. Mick Founts, Superintendent of Schools, San Joaquin County Office of Education
7. Peter Fox, Public Defender, San Joaquin County
8. Kevin Hatano, Program Coordinator, Operation Ceasefire

## Marshall Plan Committee Members ...

9. Stephanie James, Chief Probation Officer, San Joaquin County
10. James Jimenez, Interim CEO, San Joaquin County Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
11. Eric Jones, Stockton Police Chief
12. Sovanna Koeurt, Executive Director, Asian Pacific Self-Development & Residential Assoc.
13. Dr. Steve Lowder, Superintendent, Stockton Unified School District
14. Steve Moore, San Joaquin County Sheriff
15. Brett Morgan, Judge, San Joaquin County Superior Court
16. Jose Rodriguez, Executive Director, El Concilio

## Marshall Plan Committee Members ...

17. Benjamin Saffold, Downtown Stockton Alliance
18. Pastor Glen Shields, Progressive Community Church
19. Vic Singh, Director, Behavioral Health Services, San Joaquin County
20. Ger Vang, CEO, Lao Family Community of Stockton, Inc.
21. Carlos Villapudua, Supervisor, San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors
22. Doug Wilhoit, CEO, Greater Stockton Chamber of Commerce
23. James Willett, District Attorney, San Joaquin County
24. Ralph Womack, City of Stockton, Operation Peacekeeper

## Marshall Plan Committee Members ...

### **Former members**

25. Ann Johnson, former Mayor, City of Stockton
26. Carl Tolivar, former Superintendent of Stock Unified

### **Staff**

Christian Clegg, Assistant to the City Manager  
Connie Cochran, Public Information Officer  
Karen Costa, Executive Assistant to the City Manager


## PROJECT GOAL

Develop a Violence Reduction Plan

*Stop, Interrupt, and Prevent Gun Violence &  
Homicides*


## LOCAL TRENDS IN VIOLENCE

## Stockton's Recent Dramatic Increase in Homicides since 2008




\* Source: Data: FBI Uniform Crime Reports; Stockton City Police via CrimeMapping.com; (accessed May 24, 2012)



## Stockton's High Homicide Rate is Chronic




There is Evidence that the Ceasefire Program Reduced Homicides in the Past (1997 - 2002)




Homicide Rate Expected to Parallel Violence Rate: Stockton is Different



## Stockton Homicide Rate Has Not Tracked Violence Rate since 2006




## Number of Police Officers & Homicides



## Stockton Hotspots

### Violent Crimes Distribution (Stockton 11/5/2011 – 5/3/2012; n = 3640)




## Violent Crime Victims: San Joaquin Youth Homicide Victim Profile (Age 10 – 24)

- Where
  - Street (52%)
  - Inside (home of victim or other residence) (33%)
  - Vehicle (10%)
  - Other (5%)
- Circumstance
  - 19% drive-by shootings
  - 30-50% linked to argument between victim & perpetrator

\* Violence Policy Center Report, 2010

## Stockton Hotspots (November 5, 2011 - May 5, 2012)



## Local Findings:

- High violence is CHRONIC by only recently ACUTE
- No relationship between total violent crime & homicides
- Homicide trends in Stockton don't follow those of the State (local issues drive trends)
- Hot Spots can be identified and are discrete but dispersed
- Evidence that past Ceasefire program reduced violence

# WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT VIOLENCE?

## What do We Know About Violence?

- Violence is learned
- Violence is contagious
- Violence is not inevitable
- Violence can be stopped

## Risk Factors for Violence

- Anti-social norms
- Availability of guns
- School failure
- Having been a victim of violence
- Family violence
- Lack of positive role models

## Hot Places – Violence is Concentrated

30,000 street segments in Seattle (4-5% accounted for 50% of crime incidents each year over 14 years)

- FINDINGS:

Crime is not a moving target

Prediction accuracy for future crime is higher for places than people

No evidence of displacement after focus on Hot Spots - a diffusion of good effects

Chronic, truant juveniles and Hot Spots overlap

(Weisburd 2012)

## Most violent youth desist

Gang involvement increases criminal activity - only while in gang

Of youth convicted of serious felony offenses, only 8% continued on into the adult criminal justice system

(Pathways to Desistance Project)

**WHAT DOESN'T WORK  
TO REDUCE VIOLENCE**

## Relative Effectiveness of Crime / Violence Reduction Programs

30 – 50% Reduction

- Ceasefire / Ceasefire Re-entry
- Hospital Interventions
- HOPE Probation Violation Program
- Street Outreach Workers

20 – 30% Reduction

- Aggression Replacement Therapy
- High Risk Youth Crime Prevention
- Big Brother / Big Sister
- Multi-Systemic Family Treatment

10 – 20% Reduction

- Supervision & Treatment and Cognitive
- Neighborhood Disorder Reduction

NO REDUCTION

- Incarceration alone / Supervision only
- GREAT Gang Education Program

Increase Rate of Offending


- Scared Straight
- Boot Camp
- Intensive Supervision (no services)
- Juvenile Detention (all but High Violent)

Average Recidivism Reduction ~ 10%

## NYC Crime Reduction Experience


### Challenges Assumptions about Crime/Violence Reduction:

- No change in poverty
- No change in drug use
- 32% drop in prison commitments
- Not explained by change in demographics



## What Doesn't Work - Moving Individuals

(Moving On Project)



**WHAT DOES WORK TO  
REDUCE VIOLENCE**

## Characteristics of What Works

- Targeted – high risk persons, places, situations
- Changes Behavior/Norms
  - Clear and consistent messages
  - Community engagement and moral voice
  - Connect to services
  - Consequences are swift & certain
- Capacity of System to Respond

## Two Approaches to Crime Control: (Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)

### 1. Traditional ('The Hard Way')

.1000 officers

.6 months

.17,000 felony arrests

### Outcomes:

Dried up drug market

Overwhelmed Court

Success at great cost



## Two Approaches to Crime Control: (Closing an Outdoor Drug Market)

### 2. Strategic: Ceasefire Model (The 'Smart Way')

- .Data analysis to target 'influential players'
- .Warn in advance of consequences
- .Communicate that their success is important
- .Involve the Community
- .Small number of arrests

Outcomes: Dried up Drug Market  
Required little or no  
additional resources




## THE PLANNING APPROACH

## A Targeted System-Based Violence Reduction Strategy

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

## A Systems-Based Approach to Violence Reduction



Stockton California  
**Marshall Plan**



.A Violence Reduction Strategy

.David Bennett Consulting

.in association with


.Donna Lattin

*.8 February 2013*

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Our first recommendation has been funded by the City and is under development ...

## Operation Ceasefire



## The Stockton Violence Reduction Plan

1. Stop Violence: Ceasefire-like Models
2. Interrupt Violence
3. Change the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods
4. Address Non-group Violence
5. Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent Individuals
6. Prevent Violence
7. Address Trauma
8. Ensure System Capacity to Respond to Violence
9. Create a fair, humane and evidence-based System
10. Sustain Violence Reduction Efforts

## A Good Foundation From Which to Build

- Evidence-based Probation & Mental Health
- Progressive Police Chief
- Sherriff incorporating evidence-based practices
- New law enforcement collaborations
- Funding for new initiatives: Ceasefire, Violence Court, Violence Probation Unit, Warrant Task Force, etc.
- A superb Victim Services Program
- SJCOE - A culture of innovation
- Community Initiative - Ceasefire Lifeline
- Excellent Community, Court, and University prevention programs
- Involved business community
- Politicians with passion to fix problem

## The Roundtables (What We Heard from You)

- People Change People ... It's all about relationships
- We need to better coordinate our services
- Sharing Information – We must address the ‘digital divide’
- Schools need help connecting kids in need with services (A Principal)
- We need to establish mentor programs
- We need Community Ambassadors
- We need a coordinated, neighborhood level response to homicide

## Stop Violence - Hot Persons (Boston Re-entry Initiative)

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence	x		
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

- **Target Most serious violent offenders**
  - 18 - 32 years old
  - Chronic firearm & violent histories
  - Gang involvement
  - Returning to high crime neighborhood
  - High Risk
- System/Community Panel delivers message
  - DA
  - Probation & Parole
  - Community Service Organization(s)
  - Faith Community
- Family member meets inmate at release
- Follow-up: 18 months
- \* 30% reduction in violent offending at 3 years (Braga et al. 2009)

## Reducing Probationer Failure (The HOPE Program)

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence	x		
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

### Get out ahead of failure


- Target most difficult High Risk probationer, including violent, domestic violence, & sex offenders

### Judicial Warning Hearing:

- Communicate rules, consequences, & encourage compliance
- Monitor & make treatment available (random drug tests)
- Swift but short Jail sanctions

### Outcomes:

- Significant reductions in drug use & re-arrest



## Hot People – Seriously Mentally Ill

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence	x		
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

- Mentally ill are involved in 4% of violent crimes
- 11 times more likely to be victims of violence
- Targeted Prison Re-Entry with wraparound services achieves significant reductions in violence & crime

## Stop Violence – Hot People

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence	x		
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

- Ceasefire (35 - 55% reduction)
- Ceasefire Re-entry (35%+ reduction)
- Probation HOPE (27% reduction)
- Seriously Mentally Ill Offender Program (reduction)
- Family unit Probation for multi-generational violent families

## Hot Places – Blight & Disorder (Cincinnati Neighborhood Enhancement Program)

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			
Prevent Violence		x	
Build Capacity			

### Coordinated 90-day disorder blitz

- Target Hot Spaces (crime, code violations, disorder calls, indicators of blight)
- Identify local stakeholders (City & Community Team)
- Create list of improvements (crime prevention information, neighborhood cleanups, code enforcement, vacant property inspection, etc.)
- 90-day follow-up and closeout press conference / 1-year follow-up



Image source: <http://www.soapboxmedia.com/devnews/nepaward0603.aspx>

## Cincinnati Neighborhood Enhancement Program Outcome:

- Reduced crime in focus areas up to 3 years after implementation of Strategic 90-day Disorder Response

## Hot Situations (Hospital Response Program)

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			x
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

- Peer-based hospital intervention program for violently injured youth
- Goals:
  - *Reduce Retaliation*
  - *Reduce re-injury*
  - *Decrease arrest rates*
- Outcomes 50% + reductions in violence

## Hot Situations (Hospital Response Program)

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			x
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity			

“Without this program family & friends means retaliation. They stand by the bed of someone who is shot and make a plan to go get the guy who put him there to show how much they respect him.” (Sherman Spears, co-founder of Caught in the Crossfire Program)



Images: <http://www.youthalive.org/caught-in-the-crossfire/>



## High Risk Persons - Prevention

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			
Prevent Violence	x		
Build Capacity			

- Youth Accountability Board + Mentors
- High Risk Afterschool program + Mentors (Becoming a Man Program)
- Expanded opportunities (Youthbuild + Business Mentors)



Images: <http://www.youth-guidance.org/our-programs/b-a-m-becoming-a-man/>

## Prevent Violence Oregon High Risk Youth Prevention Program

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			
Prevent Violence	x		
Build Capacity			

- ID High Risk
- Entry point: School /Juvenile Justice (60 / 40%)
- Offer range of programs
- Most effective interventions:
  - Mentors
  - School engagement
- Increased recidivism when targeting low risk

## Prevent Violence - High Risk Situations (Address Trauma)

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
Stop Violence			
Prevent Violence			x
Build Capacity			

- Boys with an incarcerated father are 40% more likely to act out aggressively
- Chronic stress can affect brain development and the immune system.
- Chronic stress can create a state of 'High Alert'
- Research
  - Sensitive and supportive care-giving can buffer the effects of stress

## A Targeted System-Based Violence Reduction Strategy

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situations
<b>Stop Violence</b>	- Ceasefire - Ceasefire (Re-entry) - Mentally Ill Re-entry	- Outreach Workers - Ceasefire/Lifetime	- Hospital Response
<b>Prevent Violence</b>	- Prevention Program - Mentors + - School Aftercare - Youth Accountability Board	- Neighborhood Disorder Reduction Teams - Neighborhood Ambassadors	- Address Trauma
<b>Build Capacity</b>	- More Police - 'One Empty Bed' - Pre-Trial	- Community Corrections Center (CCC)	Philosophy - Do No Harm: - End Zero Tolerance - school - Re-examine juvenile remand

## The Stockton Violence Reduction Plan

1. Stop Violence: Ceasefire-like Models
  - ✓ Ceasefire
  - ✓ HOPE Probation
  - ✓ Ceasefire Re-entry
2. Interrupt Violence:
  - ✓ Hospital-based peer intervention
  - ✓ Street outreach workers (Peacekeepers)
3. Change the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods
  - ✓ 90-day Hot Spot Disorder blitz
4. Address Non-group Violence
  - ✓ Seriously mentally ill re-entry
  - ✓ Improve response to domestic violence

## Violence Reduction Plan (continued ...)

5. Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent Individuals
  - ✓ Develop Pre-trial risk tool (in-progress)
  - ✓ Validate Probation risk tool
  - ✓ Apply risk tool across the system (Courts, Jail, and Re-entry)
  - ✓ Fund Police data software
6. Prevent Violence:
  - ✓ Keep kids in school: Youth Accountability Board
  - ✓ Attach high risk youth to supportive adults and opportunities (Becoming a Man Program; YouthBuild)
7. Address Trauma:
  - ✓ Counseling + Mentors
8. Ensure System Capacity to Respond to Violence
9. Create a Fair, Humane and Evidence-based System
10. Sustain Violence Reduction Efforts

**ENSURE CAPACITY TO  
RESPOND TO VIOLENCE**

## System Capacity (Law Enforcement)

	Hot Persons	Hot Places	Hot Situation s
Stop Violence			
Prevent Violence			
Build Capacity	x		

Support Dr. Braga's Recommendation for 2 Police  
Officers per 1000:

.Current - 344

.Recommended - 590

# DESIGNING AN EVIDENCE-BASED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

## Creating an Evidence-Based System

Traditional System	New
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Punishment Focus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Behavior Change focus</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Throw Wide Net / Zero Tolerance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted risk-based intervention</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Severe response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Swift &amp; short</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sporadic &amp; delayed responses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Certain &amp; immediate responses</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on individuals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence: Focus on groups</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exit Custody without a plan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Step-down from Jail/Prison with support</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family &amp; Community rarely involved</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family &amp; Community involved</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jail overcrowding undermines System Integrity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 'One Empty Bed' strategy</li> </ul>

## Step Violent Offenders to the Community from Custody (The Community Corrections Center – A New Paradigm)

- High Violent exit with job search skills, mentor, and continued treatment



## Community Corrections Center (Success Rate)

- 87 percent of admissions successfully completed program
- Unsuccessful:
  - 9% rules violation
  - 3% walk away/escape
  - 1% new crime



*Washington County, OR Jail*  
**Jail Treatment Participants**  
 (3 years before and 3 years after Jail treatment)

N = 940	Arrests	Felony Convictions	Person Convictions
Percent Reduction	45%	53%	61%

**NOTE:** A high percentage of the inmates also accessed the CCC

## **Policies that Support Better Offender Outcomes**

- California's system is a failure
- One of highest prison return rates in nation (67.5% within 3 years)
- Realignment (AB 109): Let's not repeat failures of the State at the local level

## **Realignment Issues**

- No change in Sentencing Policies
- Funding formula based on past use of Prison
- No outcome data required
- No State standards
- No provision for Pre-Trial Services

**ENSURE CRIMINAL  
JUSTICE SYSTEM CAN  
DELIVER SWIFT &  
CERTAIN  
CONSEQUENCES**


**The Current System is Broken**

- A 1-year sentence = 45 days in Jail
- High number of overcrowding releases
- Only 10% of inmates who start Jail treatment finish
- 47% probationers are on warrant status
- Majority of Jail beds are occupied by Pre-Trial defendants

## System Integrity (*'The One Empty Bed' Strategy*)

- Fund Core Programs
  - Detox resources
  - Full-service Pre-Trial Program
- Create System Efficiencies: Same Justice Sooner
- Ensure Evidence-Based Policies: Realignment

## System Integrity (Pre-Trial)



# DEVELOP CRIMINAL JUSTICE MASTER PLAN

## Criminal Justice System Master Plan

- The Violence Reduction Plan should be part of a larger System Master Plan


*Data-Based Management of offenders across the criminal justice system*

## SUSTAIN VIOLENCE- REDUCTION EFFORTS


### Create an Office of Violence Prevention

- Collect & analyze data
- Recruit & train outreach workers
- Recruit mentors
- Support Community blight reduction efforts
- Develop new crime education initiatives: involve youth

## A Systems Violence Reduction Plan



## A Systems Violence Reduction Plan



## The Stockton Violence Reduction Plan

1. Stop Violence: Ceasefire-like Models
  - ✓ Ceasefire
  - ✓ HOPE Probation
  - ✓ Ceasefire Re-entry
2. Interrupt Violence:
  - ✓ Hospital-based peer intervention
  - ✓ Street outreach workers (Peacekeepers)
3. Change the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods
  - ✓ 90-day Hot Spot Disorder blitz
4. Address Non-group Violence
  - ✓ Seriously mentally ill re-entry
  - ✓ Improve response to domestic violence
5. Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent Individuals
  - ✓ Develop Pre-trial risk tool (in-progress)
  - ✓ Validate Probation risk tool
  - ✓ Apply risk tool across the system (Courts, Jail, and Re-entry)
  - ✓ Fund Police data software

## Violence Reduction Plan (continued ...)

6. Prevent Violence:
  - ✓ Keep kids in school: Youth Accountability Board
  - ✓ Attach high risk youth to supportive adults and opportunities (Becoming a Man Program; YouthBuild)
7. Address Trauma:
  - ✓ Counseling + Mentors
8. Ensure System Capacity to Respond to Violence
  - ✓ Add Police Officers
  - ✓ 'One Empty Bed': Pre-Trial Services; Detox; System efficiencies
9. Create a fair, humane and evidence-based System:
  - ✓ Community Corrections Center
10. Sustain Violence Reduction Efforts
  - ✓ Office of Violence Prevention

## What We've Done & Where We're Going - HANDOUTS

**STOCKTON VIOLENCE REDUCTION PLAN**  
*(The Marshall Plan)*

---

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 1) Stop Violence Caseload-like Models
  - ✓ Caseload
  - ✓ RFPs / Protests
  - ✓ Caseload Reviews
- 2) Intervent Violence
  - ✓ Hospital-based peer intervention
  - ✓ Street outreach workers (Proactive)
- 3) Change the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods
  - ✓ We stay out spot disaster kits
- 4) Address Non-group Violence
  - ✓ Identify mentally ill wrap
  - ✓ Improve response to domestic violence
- 5) Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent Individuals
  - ✓ Training Pre-Trial case staff (Programs)
  - ✓ Violence Prediction risk tool
  - ✓ Apply risk tool across the System (Courts, Jail, and Re-entry)
  - ✓ Fund Police data software
- 6) Prevent Violence
  - ✓ Keep kids in school: Youth Accountability Board
  - ✓ At-risk high risk youth to register adults and organizations (Dorming + Men Program - Youthful)
  - ✓ Develop Family Protection Unit
- 7) Address Trauma
  - ✓ Counseling + Mentors
- 8) Ensure System Capacity to Respond to Violence
  - ✓ Add police officers
  - ✓ What Family Now? Pre-Trial Services, Detox, System effectiveness
  - ✓ Adopter prosecution & defense resources
- 9) Create a Fair, Humane and Evidence Based System: A New Paradigm
  - ✓ Community Corrections Center
- 10) Sustain Violence Reduction Efforts
  - ✓ Office of Violence Prevention

**STOCKTON VIOLENCE REDUCTION PLAN**  
*(The Marshall Plan)*

---

**NEW INITIATIVES - Since start of Marshall Plan Project**

- 1) Stop Violence Caseload-like Models
  - ✓ Caseload
  - ✓ Women Ops
  - ✓ Community Response Teams
  - ✓ Case/Trial Time
  - ✓ Victim Outreach/Support
  - ✓ Collaborative Programs (e.g. veterans)
  - ✓ Violence Court
  - ✓ Proactive Violence Unit
- 2) Intervent Violence
  - ✓ Redwood Practitioners to focus on Street Outreach
- 3) Change the Norms / Reclaim the Neighborhoods
  - ✓ New Police Advisory Council
- 4) Address Non-group Violence
  - ✓ Expansion of crisis & support services (housing & treatment) for women in
- 5) Capability to Identify High Risk / Violent Individuals
  - ✓ Pre-Trial risk tool development study (National Institute of Corrections)
- 6) Prevent Violence
- 7) Address Trauma
- 8) Ensure System Capacity to Respond to Violence
  - ✓ ASSTO body dedicated to partial Pre-Trial program expansion
- 9) Create a Fair, Humane and Evidence-Based System: A New Paradigm
  - ✓ City & County officials invest in new Community Corrections Center in Program
- 10) Sustain Violence Reduction Efforts

# NEXT STEPS ...

## Einstein

Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results

## Clint Eastwood (Super Bowl 2012)

".....It's half-time in America (Stockton)..... We find a way through tough times, and if we can't find a way, then we'll make one. All that matters now is what's ahead, how do we come from behind. How do we come together ..... It's half-time America (Stockton) and our second half is about to begin."

Voltaire (Famous French  
Philosopher)

“No problem can withstand the assault of  
sustained thinking.”

Deis (Nobody)

“No problem can withstand the assault  
of sustained thinking and then sustained  
execution”

## Next Steps

- Written report and presentation to Project Sponsor (City Council)
- Conversation with community
- If okay, how does the City pay for it's role?
- Bankruptcy Check-In
- Execution (When & How)

